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The Mekong River Commission: Does It Work,
and How Does the Mekong Basin’s Geography
Influence Its Effectiveness?
Ellen Bruzelius Backer
Abstract
This article assesses the effectiveness of the Mekong River Commission, its impact on the policies
of its members, Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Viet Nam, and their engagement with the
Commission. It also seeks to account for China’s influence on their cooperation, as China, the
strongest upstream riparian state, is not a member of this cooperation scheme for the Mekong
River basin. This is achieved using a model for explaining regime effectiveness which rests on the
two main variables of problem malignancy and problem-solving capacity. Furthermore, the level
of engagement of the riparians is accounted for by mainly two geographical variables: position on
the river (upstream/downstream), and size of fraction of territory within the basin. (Manuscript
received February 10, 2007; accepted for publication July 4, 2007)
Keywords: Mekong River Commission, regime effectiveness, Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia, Viet
Nam, PR China
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Die Mekong River Commission: Funktioniert sie
und wie beeinflusst die Geografie des
Mekong-Beckens ihre Effektivität?
Ellen Bruzelius Backer
Abstract
Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Effektivität der Mekong River Commission (MRC), ihre
Auswirkung auf die Politik der Mitgliedsstaaten Thailand, Laos, Kambodscha und Vietnam sowie
das Engagement dieser Länder in der Kommission. Darüber hinaus wird der Einfluss des mächtigen
Anrainerstaates Chinas, das zwar kein Mitglied ist, jedoch Beobachterstatus hat, analysiert. Um
die Effektivität der MRC zu messen, wird ein Modell aus der Regimetheorie herangezogen, das
auf den Variablen Malignität und Problemlösungskapazität basiert. Das Hauptargument der Studie
lautet, dass das Engagement der Anrainerstaaten in der Mekong River Commission primär durch
zwei geografische Bestimmungsfaktoren erklärt werden kann: erstens durch die Lage der Länder
(stromaufwärts, stromabwärts), zweitens durch den Umfang ihres Territoriums im Mekong-Becken.
(Manuskript eingereicht am 10.02.2007; zur Veröffentlichung angenommen am 04.07.2007)
Keywords: Mekong River Commission, Regimeeffektivität, Thailand, Laos, Kambodscha, Vietnam,
VR China
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1 Introduction
The Mekong River Commission, which addresses issues relating to the Mekong
River, has a particular membership profile where the four downstream countries,
Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam, are members, whilst the two
extreme upstream, China and Burma, are not, but rather hold observer status
with the Commission. The Mekong River has been largely untouched until
now, however, the basin and the riparians have reached a turning point where
projects with significant environmental, social and economic impact are being
planned and implemented on both the tributaries and the mainstream of the
river. The Mekong River Commission, which attained its present foundation in
1995, is intended to be concerned with sustainable development and resource
handling of the Mekong River and could potentially address the entire river
basin’s ecosystem, including tributaries and wetlands. Nonetheless, it has so far
not been successful to the extent its donors perhaps had hoped for. This article
will attempt to assess the achievements and evaluate the effectiveness of the
Mekong River Commission as a regime, guided by the theoreticalmodel outlined
by Underdal (2002). Subsequently, the article will introduce geographical factors
as an explanatory variable, and explain the effectives – or lack thereof – in light
of this perspective.
The Mekong River Commission has two main characteristics: firstly, it has a
geographical scope, and is defined by the ecosystem of a river basin rather than a
specific topic or problem issue. Secondly, the members of the Commission are all
either developing countries or newly industrialised countries. Most regimes that
have been assessed so far have had at least one industrialised state as member,
and on this point, the analysis of the Mekong River Commission distinguishes
itself from previous analyses of regimes’ effectiveness. These characteristics have
implications for how theory may be applied and understood, and how effects of
the Commissionmay be recognised. The experiences from this exercise are drawn
upon in the final section of the article, which attempts to assess how geographical
factors, particularly the upstream/downstream position and fraction of each
member’s total territory within the regime’s ecosystem boundaries, affect each
member’s efforts within the regime. The idea is that in a regime or cooperation
defined by geographical rather than topical boundaries, the geography of the
regime and its members will have important consequences for the cooperation
and how effective it is. This, of course, relates to the concept of geopolitics,
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which has been defined as “the influence, or the study of influence, of spatial
aspects on the political nature, history, institutions, etc. of states or nations, and
especially on their political and economic relations with other states” (Clark
[1985] 2003:171). In the sense that this article will attempt to explain whether
and how geographical qualities of the river basin have an impact on the politics of
cooperation, it will address geopolitical factors. However, to distinguish clearly
between the purely spatial aspects and the political aspects, the article will use
‘geography’ as terminology to identify these spatial aspects.
The article starts off by briefly revisiting relevant theoretical contributions for
understanding regime effectiveness, hereunder Underdal’s (2002) model, before
it outlines the main characteristics ofMekong River, its riparians and the Mekong
River regime, and assesses its achievements. The following section discusses how
the special characteristics of a geographically defined regime affect the potential
for an effective regime, before a few concluding remarks are made.
2 Regime Effectiveness
Regimes have been defined by Krasner ([1983] 1986:2) as “sets of implicit
or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”,
a definition which has become widely accepted and used. It is questionable
whether the Mekong River Commission fulfils the criteria to be labelled a regime.
The present basin cooperation is based on the Agreement on the Cooperation for
the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin (further on the “1995
Agreement”), signed by the four members in 1995, which spells out areas of
cooperation, institutional framework and general proceedings. One could regard
this Agreement as a set of explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures which validates labelling the Mekong River Commission as a regime.
Nonetheless, the lack of details in the 1995 Agreement, for example regarding the
definition of “tributary” to themain river, and its slow and limited implementation,
regarding for example the establishment of “procedures” as described in section
3.2, are sufficiently significant to justify the discussion of whether the Mekong
RiverCommission constitutes a regime or not. This, however,will not be assessed
here, the point is that applying the tools for analysing regime effectiveness allows
a fruitful review of the Mekong case. Therefore, the cooperation taking place
under the 1995 Agreement will be referred to as a regime, though this is not
intended to imply that the debate of the applicability of Krasner’s definition has
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been concluded.
This article will not elaborate on the theoretical discussion of how to recognise
and measure the effectiveness of a regime (for a discussion of this, see for instance
Underdal 2002, Kütting 2000 or Wettestad 2006 for a summary), but focus
on the prerequisites for its success or failure. The effectiveness of a regime
can, according to Underdal (2002:3), be explained by two main variables: the
character of the problem the regime addresses or seeks to address, and the
problem-solving capacity of the institutional tools applied and the actors that
approach this problem. The character of the problem may be benign or malign
to a greater or lesser extent in two ways: intellectually, implying the extent
to which intellectual capacity and energy is needed to provide an accurate
description and analysis to suggest appropriate solutions, and politically, as “a
function of the configuration of actor interests and preferences that it generates”
(Underdal 2002:15). Knowledge deficits about the problem makes it harder
to achieve affective governance (Young 1994:18), as does a high number of
riparian states with undefined rights to certain quantities and quality of the
water (Bernauer 1997:161, 172). The second main variable, the problem-solving
capacity, contains three main elements: the institutional setting of the regime,
the distribution of power among the actors involved, and the skill and energy
that are put into the efforts to address the problem (Underdal 2002:23). A
beneficial contractual environment, such as the institutional setting, is important
for states to “make and keep agreements that incorporate jointly enacted rules,
without debilitation fear of free-riding or cheating by others” (Keohane, Haas,
Levy 1993:19). Wettestad (2006:308-310) has listed five central obstacles related
to the institutional structure that affect the effectiveness of a regime, of which
differences in capabilities amongst the actors and varying perception of the
seriousness of the problem stand out as particularly relevant for the Mekong
case. Underdal (2002:29) furthermore suggests that “the existence of a unipolar
distribution of power tends to enhance the decision-making capacity of the
system”. This is one of the peculiarities of the Mekong River regime: China, the
riparian which is the obvious candidate as the region’s unipolar power, is not a
member of the regime. How does this affect the cooperation? These aspects will
be addressed below.
3 The Mekong River Basin and the Mekong River Regime
The Mekong River is one of the world’s mighty rivers. On its 4,200 km long
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journey from the origin in the Tibetan Plateau, it passes through the Southwest
corner of China, Lao PDR, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Viet Nam, before
it emanates into the South China Sea. Approximately 70 million people live
in the basin, belonging to more than 100 ethnic groups (Cogels 2005). A cold
climate with snow which may store precipitate is only found in the Himalayan
plateau (Browder andOrtolano 2000:501), and the monsoon season and tropical
climate cause the river to have a particular pulse where the wet season from
May to November may account for 85-90% of the total flow of the river (Dore
2003:423). Human life, flora and fauna within the river basin have adapted
to this particular rhythm through centuries. The flow pulse causes the river to
force water back up the Tonle Sap River at the Mekong/Tonle Sap river junction
by Phnom Penh in Cambodia each year during the wet season, which in turns
leads the Tonle Sap Lake to expand to from a surface area of approximately
2,000 km2 to approximately 10,000 km2 or more (Browder 1998:36). During
the dry season, the lake empties back into the Mekong River mainstream. The
river basin’s resources are vital for its population, as about 85% “make their
living directly from the natural resources base” of the basin (Jacobs 2002:356).
The only major development projects on the mainstream of the river are found
in China, where several hydropower dams are currently under construction or
have been completed. Thailand, Lao PDR and Viet Nam have built hydropower
stations on tributaries to the Mekong.
The cooperation on the development and management of the Mekong River
and the resources of the basin dates back to 1957, when the Committee for
Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin, known as the
Mekong Committee, was initiated with Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and what was
then known as South Vietnam as its founding members. The current cooperation
is based on the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development
of the Mekong River Basin (the 1995 Agreement), signed in 1995 by Thailand,
Lao PDR, Cambodia and Viet Nam. China and Burma hold observer status and
attend an annual dialogue meeting, but are not signatories to the treaty. The
signatories aim to “cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality and territorial
integrity in the utilization and protection of the water resources of the Mekong
River Basin” (Agreement 1995:Article 4), but the regime has “no mandate
to act on its own in any fashion that has not been approved by the member
countries” (Osborne 2004:9). The Commission has a secretariat, the Mekong
River Commission Secretariat, located in Vientiane, which hosts the majority
37 37
37 37
The Mekong River Commission 37
of the sector programmes of the regime, such as the Environment Programme
and the Agriculture, Irrigation and Forestry Programme. The sector programmes
feed into a Basin Development Plan which is meant to guide development of the
lower river basin (Mekong River Commission 2005).
Hitherto, the water quality has not been a major problem, rather, the main
negotiating issue has been the quantity of the water in the river, noting that
the water quality may be an effect of the water quantity: low water levels do
for example increase salinity. This reflects two aspects of the river basin: firstly,
the huge differences in the river’s flow levels in the wet and dry seasons, and
secondly, that there is little industrial development in the river basin that affect
the water quality. The controversies and issues of tension between the riparians
has been withdrawal of water from the basin through inter- or intra-basin transfer
schemes, and withholding of the water in large dams constructed for hydropower
or irrigation purposes. These issues are particularly crucial during the dry season,
when low water levels are a major concern for the riparians, particularly those
furthest downstream.
The Mekong River Commission (MRC) is currently using a fairly limited
definition of “tributary” to the Mekong mainstream, which implies that the MRC
has made itself irrelevant to much of the development work that is planned for
the Mekong’s tributaries, and financed through channels such as the ADB or
Chinese private sector (interview 4.2; see chapter 6). The narrow definition also
gives the member countries incentives to develop tributaries as they are excluded
from the Agreement of 1995, and no notification of other MRC members is
required (interview 3.3, interview 4.2). It has been suggested that this definition,
separating tributaries and the mainstream, is made for the sake of convenience to
accommodate these kinds of policies (Lebel et al. 2005). The MRC cooperation
is focusing on water-sharing, not on sharing of benefit, although this has been
proposed by the donors (interview 4.4) and by Thailand (interview 4.1).
It has been suggested that many state actors of the riparian members states
prefer the MRC to be a rather toothless organisation that identifies development
projects and attracts external funds, whilst the control of the development
remains with the states themselves (Dore 2003:425). The 1995 Agreement has
been described as weak, allowing the members to interpret it as they please
(interview 4.4) or simply sideline it (Lebel et al. 2005). The region is marked
by “genuine, recent, bad blood” (interview 4.2), and the MRC has focused
on gathering data and building capacity because these areas are less sensitive
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(interview 3.2), aiming to build trust between the member states. Some also
claim that the regime relies on a unique “Mekong Spirit” that has been created
after decades of cooperation (interview 3.3, Öjendal 2000:113) and on a special
wish to cooperate (interview 4.5). The new CEO has tried to shift the profile of
the organisation to an increased focus on investment facilitation, a move which
has showed to be somewhat controversial and has been perceived or described
negatively by several (interview 3.4, interview 3.5, interview 4.1, interview 4.4,
interview 4.5).
The Mekong River Commission is, nonetheless, not the only body applying a
regional perspective on the Mekong River Basin. Amongst others is the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) which initiated a program called the Greater Mekong
Subregion Program (GMS), comprising Cambodia, the People’s Republic of
China, Lao People’s Democratic Republic,Myanmar, Thailand, and VietNam, in
1992. The program has, according to the ADB, “contributed to the development
of infrastructure to enable the development and sharing of the resource base,
and promote the freer flow of goods and people in the subregion” (http://www.
adb.org/GMS/). The main focus of the program has been infrastructure through
support for a number of so-called ‘economic corridors’ and encouragement of
easier movement of goods and people within the region. However, in the past
years the program has increasingly included other policy fields, a notable example
of this being its Core Environment Program, endorsed at the GMS summit in
2005 (http://www.adb.org/Projects/core-environment-program/default.asp). The
scope of the GMS thus partially overlaps with that of the MRC. The Greater
Mekong Subregion Program is attractive to the riparian states because of the
availability of funding, loans, grants and co-financing from the ADB. Some of the
participants might also be attracted to the program by the lack of an overarching
organisational structure.
The Mekong River Commission and the ADB cooperate on certain issues.
The ADB is a donor to theMRC and is granted observer status to the Commission,
which allows the bank to participate in formal meetings held by the MRC. The
ADB also supports the MRC Flood Management and Mitigation Program, based
in Cambodia, and there is an ongoing process to make the coexistence and
cooperation between the GMS Program and Mekong River Commission smooth
and fruitful. The “International Conference on the Mekong River Commission”
in Hanoi 23-24 April 2007 issued a statement in which, amongst other things,
the participants: basin representatives, donors, NGOs and international organi-
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sations, claimed that they “would like to see the MRC more actively involved
in GMS programmes in the Mekong Basin within its mandate” (http://www.mr-
cmekong.org/MRC_news/press07/joint-statement-on-MRC.htm). There is no
doubt, however, that the side-by-side existence of the GMS Program and the
more organisation-like MRC has at times been difficult both for the riparians
and the involved external actors.
3.1 The Basin States’ Attitude towards Basin Cooperation
The member states have different aspirations for the regime. Thailand, of which
approximately a third, 36%, lies within theMekong River Basin (Dore 2003:423),
prefers a loosely defined framework for cooperation. She has been accused of
unnecessarily delaying the establishment of flow regime regulations, using the
need for extensive public hearings as excuse. Browder (2000:257), speaking
of the negotiations prior to the 1995 Agreement, noted that Thailand, “as the
regional economic power and relative upstream state [ . . . ] [is] probably not as
motivated to formulate water utilization rules as the other MRC states”. Also
Osborne (2004:8) has suggested that Thailand is concerned that regulations
could restrict her freedom of action, particularly related to future water diversion
projects. As Thailand is a fairly advanced country with an established legal system
and bureaucracy, and a developed economy, she does not need the development
resources that the MRC can provide (interview 4.4). Thailand also has a more
pronounced position on issues like EIA regulations, is less interested in adapting
current procedures to those suggested by the MRC (interview 3.1, interview
4.4), and doesn’t need the capacity of the organisation as much as some of
the other members (interview 3.2). Differences like these will, according to
Wettestad (2006:308-310) as mentioned previously, influence the effectiveness
of the cooperation regime. The strength of the Thai economy also gives her
a confidence that, together with her position as the upstream country within
the cooperation, makes her more reluctant to give into demands from the
other members (interview 3.1). She is sceptical of some of the MRC policy
recommendations (interview 3.2), and finds the demands from the downstream
riparians to be too strict (interview 4.1). She considers some of them to be too
concerned with their general downstream position, refusing to recognise their
own position as upstream to one or two other countries (interview 4.1). Thailand
seems for example not to be keen on a detailed flow management scheme as
wanted by the downstream riparians (interview 3.4), partially because she claims
40 40
40 40
40 Ellen Bruzelius Backer
that this has no purpose without Chinese participation (interview 4.1). Thailand
and China have a joint interest in a lenient water flow regime (interview 4.1),
and Thailand would rather see the MRC as a facilitator than as a body imposing
regulations upon its members, possibly for sovereignty reasons (interview 4.1).
Because the majority of Thai parts of the Mekong basin are found within the
somewhat peripheral and underdeveloped north-eastern Isan region, the Mekong
Cooperation receives less attention from the government in Bangkok (interview
3.2, interview 4.4, interview 4.5).
Lao PDR,which has 97% of her territorywithin theMekongRiverBasin (Dore
2003:423) has an abundance of unexploited water resources in theMekong River
tributaries that drain her territory. This gives her a central position in the future
use of the water in the Mekong River basin (Cheong 1998:222-223), but also
makes her attach significance to theMekong River regime. There are, nonetheless,
indications that the Laotian government prefers to have the liberty to develop the
Mekong tributaries according to its own preferences without having to adhere
to regime recommendations. The limited human and bureaucratic resources,
which are amongst the lowest in the region, hold back Laotian efforts within the
regime. Some interviewees suggested that certain MRC policy recommendations,
perhaps especially those regarding public participation, are unacceptable to the
Laotian government. They do not want to adopt these policies (interview 3.2),
as public participation in their eyes requires more time and resources without
providing any benefits (interview 3.5). The Laotian government may agree to
the rhetoric of MRC policies, but is less interested in taking any concrete action
in some sectors. For instance, they refuse to conduct studies on the effects of
logging on the water flow (interview 3.5). However, given her historical lack
of regulation and limited capacity, she is fairly accommodating to MRC policy
recommendations because they save her from doing the job herself (interview 3.1).
She also benefits from skills within the MRC regarding policy implementation
(interview 3.2), and is interested in the funding, data and competence available
through the MRC (interview 3.1, interview 3.2, Browder 2000:243). It has
also been suggested that Laos does not want as strict a water flow regime as the
countries further downstream would like (interview 3.4).
Cambodia is emerging from decades of civil war and conflict, and although
a democracy on the paper, she is still plagued by political violence and lack of
respect for human rights (Amnesty International 2006; Utrikesdepartementet
2002:2). A total of 86% of her territory is found within the Mekong River basin
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(Dore 2003:423), and the Cambodian people depend on the resources, partic-
ularly fish, the wetlands have to offer (Öjendal 2000:138; Badenoch 2002:3).
The Cambodian fisheries are likely to be severely affected in unpredictable ways
by upstream altering of the natural flow regime of the Mekong River (Hirsch
2006:189). Cambodia successfully insisted that the natural annual reversal of the
Tonle Sap river during the wet season should be guaranteed by the 1995 Agree-
ment (Agreement 1995:Article 6 B), and also achieved acceptance for locating the
Regional Flood Management and Mitigation Centre in Phnom Penh. However,
the Cambodian government’s limited resources and capacity hinder thorough
engagement with the regime. For Cambodia, the direction of the development
of the Mekong River basin is perceived to have a more direct and serious impact
on the well-being of the country than what is likely for certain others of the
regime members, which might make Cambodia more eager to see a strict regime
than other members. This differing perception of the seriousness of the issue
might affect the effectiveness of the regime (Wettestad 2006:308-310). However,
incidents in the past such as the Yali incident1 have made Cambodia disappointed
with what the MRC can achieve for her (interview 3.2). This has increased
after the new CEO in the MRC took office (interview 3.4). There are also some
indications that the government in Phnom Penh is more preoccupied with issues
such as casinos on the Thai border and logging than with the management of
water resources (interview 3.5), and that it has not been concerned with securing
Cambodia’s natural assets (Osborne 2004:43, 44; De Lopez 2002).
Approximately 20% of Viet Namese territory lies within the Mekong River
basin (Dore 2003:423), where the delta in the south is the largest and arguably
the most important area. The delta is inhabited by 17 million people (Browder
2000:241) and produces 90% of the rice and 53% of the shrimp and fish export
from Viet Nam (Quang 2002:263). The area accounts for 27% of Viet Nam’s
total GDP (Minh [2001]:1), and is vital for Viet Nam. The delta is plagued by
salt water intrusion during the dry season which inhibits agricultural production
(Jacobs 2002:356), and affects approximately 16,000 km2 out of a total of
39,000 km2 (Makim 2002:29). The significance of the delta for Viet Nams
1 The “Yali incident” happened in 2000 when Viet Nam, without prior notice to Cambodia,
opened the gates at the Yali Falls Dam in Viet Nam, 70 km upstream from the Cambodian border.
This led to an unexpected flood in Cambodia which killed several people and caused material
damage (Öjendal, Mathur, Sithirith 2002:18-19).
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well-being makes her eager to see a strict flow regime for the Mekong River
and attach importance to the Mekong River regime, however, her position
as upstream on certain transboundary tributaries, such as the Yali River, and
her human capacity and economic strength, which is relatively large compared
to other states in the region, also implies that she is not as concerned about
the regime as the smaller riparians might be (Browder 2000:243). Viet Nam
provides technical assistance to the MRC (interview 3.2). This difference may,
as noted above, affect the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime, although
the combined vulnerability and importance of the delta suggests that Viet Nam
is interested in a predictable flow regime for the Mekong River. It has also been
claimed that Vietnam has an arrogant attitude towards difficult issues within the
MRC and particularly towards Cambodian interests (interview 3.4, interview 3.5,
interview 4.6, interview 4.7). The Vietnamese government is by some perceived
as nationalistic and unwilling to share information (interview 3.4). If these
perceptions are correct, this attitude towards the river basin cooperation and its
principles will influence the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime.
As for the most significant non-member riparian, China, the unquestionable
giant of East and Southeast Asia, the Mekong River basin constitutes only 3% of
China’s total territory (Öjendal 2000:15). The area of the basin within China is
narrowly shaped with steep valleys and gorges (McCormack 2001:17) and well
suited for hydropower development (Osborne 2004:1). The Chinese stretches of
the river has a potential of 25,000 MW (megawatt), for comparison, the Three
Gorges Dam will have an installed capacity of 18,200 MW (Magee 2006:29).
Currently there are confirmed plans for eight dams, with a proposal of another six
(Makim 2002:37). Two dams, Manwan and Dachaoshan, have been completed,
and one, Xiaowan, is under construction (Dore and Yu 2004:19). According
to McCormack (2001:15), the dams will have an installed capacity of 15,000
MW, approximately 80% of the Three Gorges Dam. China and the Mekong
River Commission agreed on terms for technical cooperation on sharing water
level information during the wet season in 2002, an agreement which has been
operating since 2004. The MRC has equipped two hydrological stations in
Yunnan and established a Data Centre in Kunming (Mekong River Commission
2004:104), and the cooperation is working to a satisfying degree despite a few
stumbling blocks. China has argued that harnessing the Mekong River upstream
on Chinese territory, mainly through hydropower development, will prove to
have beneficial impacts downstream (Lebel et al. 2005; Osborne 2004:15) or
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no environmental impacts (De Lopez 2002:362). The MRC has little, if any
influence on Chinese policies (interview 1.3, interview 2.1, interview 2.3).
One interviewee claimed that the Chinese understand the concerns raised by
the downstream riparians, expressed in international forums and at the technical
level, but refuse to take this into account at the national decision-making level
(interview 4.1). The interviewee suggested that “China knows how to play
the game” to obtain what she wants (interview 4.1). Nonetheless, China is
motivated to be an observer at the MRC because she wants to be on good
terms with her neighbours (interview 1.3, interview 3.1, interview 3.6). At
the annual dialogue meeting between China, Burma and the MRC, the MRC
normally provides for the two Burmese representatives and two representatives
from China. Nonetheless, China usually comes with a delegation of seven to
ten persons. This indicates an interest in the MRC and intentions of being a
good neighbour (interview 3.1). The Chinese government has been increasingly
concerned with having a good relationship to her neighbours over the last few
years, particularly since the change of leadership in 2003 (interview 2.1, interview
3.1, interview 3.6). However, China may also use her position as an observer to
assess the strength of the cooperation in the lower Mekong Basin (interview 3.5).
There are several reasons why China is not a member of the Mekong River
Commission. Firstly, China has many international rivers, 15 mainstreams, and
more than 40 if tributaries are included (He and Kung 1998:301). To China, the
Mekong is not a unique case, and she is therefore reluctant to give concessions
to the downstream Mekong riparians because she fears that this will make
other downstream countries in other rivers make similar demands (interview 1.3,
interview 2.3). Secondly, China prefers broader agreements and cooperation
to what was portrayed as the rather narrow agenda of the MRC (interview 1.2,
interview 1.3). China finds the Agreement of 1995 too strict (interview 1.3,
interview 4.4). This suggestion is supported by the fact that China has joined
the ADB’s cooperation programme for the Mekong region, the GMS. Thirdly,
if China was to join the MRC, she would have to accept the agreement as it
is (Agreement 1995:Article 39). This is unacceptable to China because it does
not pay enough attention to the circumstances and environment of the upper
parts of the Mekong (interview 2.1), and does not recognise the services that
the upstream provides to the downstream areas (interview 1.3). Fourthly, it has
been suggested that some of the donor agencies and some of the MRC member
countries do not want China to participate in the MRC (interview 2.1). Thus,
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China is perhaps not seriously considered as a potential member. Fifthly and
lastly, the Mekong River is located far away in what from a Beijing perspective is
a remote corner of China. This makes it harder for Mekong questions to reach
the top of the agenda of the central policy makers (interview 1.1, interview 2.3).
The sixth and final Mekong River riparian, Burma, has only 4% of her total
territory within the Mekong River Basin, which contributes only 2% of the total
flow to the river (Dore 2003:423). Burma has been active only to a limited extent
in all forms of regional cooperation, but Burmese representatives do attend the
annual dialogue meetings with the Mekong River Commission. However, Burma
plays only a small role in the governance of the Mekong River basin.
This brief outline has shown how different the riparian states are, and how the
importance of the river to each state varies. China, which is the extreme upstream,
is also the most powerful in terms of both financial and human resources. Burma
has so far been negligible in Mekong politics, whilst the four members of the
Mekong River Commission have different needs and priorities for the use of
the river’s resources. This is partly a result of their different levels of economic
development and bureaucratic consolidation. Thailand is possibly the most
advanced of the four, in terms of both economic and human resources, whilst
Viet Nam also has important human and bureaucratic resources. Both wish to
secure leverage for their own use of the Mekong River’s resources, Thailand
through lax water regulation procedures, and VietNam through safeguarding the
beneficial conditions for the Mekong River delta. Cambodia and Lao are both
poor, developing countries whose populations are to a large extent dependent
on access to and use of natural resources for household purposes.
3.2 An Assessment of the Mekong River Regime
The Mekong River Commission can not be claimed to have a decisive impact on
themembers’management of the basin’s natural resources. Themember states are
claimed to prioritise national interest above trans-basin cooperation.2 Although
there are clear indications that the regime has matured since its inception in 1957,
it has not evolved into a regulatory organisation for the river basin, and can
not be considered very effective if regarded as a regime. The 1995 Agreement
is not reflected in the Commission’s members’ respective water laws, and the
2 See Hirsch and Jensen (2006), chapter 4, for a discussion of the understanding of ‘national
interest’ in the Mekong region.
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regime has largely been driven by donor funding and non-riparian leadership in
the secretariat (Hirsch and Jensen 2006:34-42, 81). Nonetheless, the Mekong
River Commission Secretariat has, through its donor-funded programs, gathered
substantial amounts of information and technical knowledge on the basin and
its resources (Backer 2006:66; Hirsch 2006:193). It has, however, so far not
been willing “to apply this knowledge more proactively to decision-making on
appropriate river basin management” (Hirsch and Jensen 2006:92), and the
development of a flow regime based on agreed regulations has been painstakingly
slow and difficult.
Four out of five intended procedures have been approved by theMekong River
Commissions decision-making body – the Council (Mekong River Commission
2001, 2003, 2003, 2005, 2006) – although some of them have a serious lack
of detail. The Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement
postpone the decision on the length of the wet and dry seasons for later through
stating that the “MRC JC [Joint Council] will decide on the actual dates of
the start and the end of the wet and dry seasons”, as well as leaving a precise
definition of tributary to the Mekong River mainstream for later (Mekong River
Commission 2003:section 1). This indicates that the member states lack the will
to commit to a strict regime with specified procedures to establish a flow regime,
curbing the accomplishments of the cooperation. The proposal for the Second
Basin Development Plan (BDP2) in 2005 sparked a debate on the appropriate
role for the commission between the member states, the secretariat’s leadership
and the donor group. The controversy originates in the donor group’s reaction
to the Mekong River Commission’s new profile of investment facilitation for
projects as described in the Second BasinDevelopment Plan. The donors perceive
this role to lie outside of its mandate as a river basin organisation (Hirsch and
Jensen 2006:93), but the final direction of the organisation is yet to be settled.
4 How Does the Geography of a Regime Affect Its
Effectiveness?
This article suggests that the effectiveness of regimes and international bodies
for cooperation with a geographical area as its target is influenced by the
membership of the regime, that is, who are actually members of the regime,
and by the geographic position of the members within the regime’s range (its
ecosystem boundaries). This section will address these two aspects in light of the
assessment and experience of the Mekong River Commission.
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4.1 Inclusiveness in Membership
Inclusiveness, implying the participation of all significant states, has been sug-
gested as one of the fundamental requirements for a regime (Kütting 2000:35;
Underdal 1980:35). It is nonetheless important to notice that Krasner’s definition
of regimes as such does not require this inclusiveness, rather, it is the effectiveness
of a regime that necessitates the inclusion of all significant states. A regime that
does not include or constructively cooperate with all stakeholder states will
have a limited scope for policies and action compared to a regime in which all
stakeholder states are engaged members or partners. This becomes particularly
important when the regime deals with an ecosystem such as a river basin. In a
case where states with territory within the river basin’s ecosystem boundaries
chose not to be, or are not invited as, members of the regime, the regime will not
have legitimacy to approach and manage the entire ecosystem. This point is valid
independently of how strict, well-defined and inclusive the regime’s regulations
are. Non-membership of stakeholder states within the ecosystem boundaries of
the regime is likely to lead to a less effective regime regarded from an ecosystem
perspective, all other things equal.
The Mekong River regime clearly illustrates this. As particularly China but
also Burma are not members, the Mekong River Commission is prevented from
letting its programs address the entire basin. The Commission cannot access
data at its own discretion from the areas outside its range, and its principles
for cooperation are not necessarily adhered to by Burma and China in their
management of the river basin areas in their territory. Speaking of China, Hirsch
claims that her non-membership “keeps open a unilateral stance on river basin
development” (Hirsch 2006:193). Should Chinese dams upstream alter the
natural flow pattern of the river, the downstream regime members will have
to adjust their behaviour to the new flow situation with few opportunities to
influence the Chinese management of these dams through the presentMekong
RiverCommission regime. TheMRC can not expect that requests for information
on the operation of the dams affecting the water level in the river will be met.
As long as the Mekong River regime is unable to approach these issues because
China, and to a limited extent Burma, are not members of the regime, the
effectiveness of the regime will be limited. However, and significantly, a regime
as such is not prevented from existing by this incomplete membership.
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4.2 Geographical Position
There are two aspects of a state’s geographical location that influence its relation
to the regime: upstream or downstream position along the river, and fraction
of the states’ territory within the ecosystem boundaries of the regime. Underdal
(2002:19) claims that the upstream/downstream relationship is a good example of
negatively correlated interests that characterise an asymmetrical problem where
the interests or values of the parties involved in the regime are incompatible
or negatively correlated. This is a part of the political aspect of the problem
malignity mentioned above, and reflects a situation where one state’s use of the
water and related resources will, partially or fully, prevent another state from
using the water on its territory according to its own preferences. In most cases,
the actions of an upstream state will pose limitations further downstream, but
the opposite is also possible (Bernauer 1997:162). There are cases where actions
upstream have positive side effects downstream, for instance will upstream dams
enable improved flood control downstream. It is not unreasonable to expect that
in most cases the downstream states will wish to increase the predictability of
the behaviour of the upstream states through a regime or agreement in order
to prevent harm and secure their own possibilities for use of the water and
related resources. Nonetheless, upstream states might consider these regulations
a threat to their sovereignty. This situation complicates cooperation for joint
management of the river and its resources.
Each member’s fraction of territory within the regime’s ecosystem boundaries
may influence the individual regime members’ commitment to the regime. A
regime member with a large fraction of its territory within the regime’s range
may be more committed to the regime as long as it perceives the regime to be in
its interests than a member with only a small fraction of its total area within the
ecosystem boundaries of the regime. All other things equal, states of which the
regime addresses only a small part of its territory are expected to be less willing
to allocate resources to the regime than members where the regime’s range
covers extensive parts of its territory. This implies that the member’s dedication
to the regime will vary with the size of their fraction of territory within the
regime’s range and to which the regime’s policies are applicable. Similarly will
the effectiveness of a regime be limited if member states with large areas within
the regime boundaries do not support the regime.
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Together, the upstream/downstream location and fraction of territory within
regime range may be illustrated as follows:
Table 1 Fraction of territory within regime range
Fraction of territory within regime range
Position along
river
Low High
Upstream Riparians expected to be the
least committed to the regime
Ambiguous relationship to the
regime
Downstream Ambiguous relationship to the
regime
Riparians expected to be the
most committed to the regime
Source: Author’s own compilation.
The countries located in the lower right square are expected to be the most
committed to the regime, whilst those in the upper left are expected to be the
least interested in cooperation within the regime for a joint approach to the
management of the river at stake. States located within the two other squares will
be in a middle position, and probably have a somewhat ambiguous commitment
to the regime.
Applied to the Mekong River Basin, the riparian states fit into the table as
follows (non-members in brackets):
Table 2 Riparian states
Fraction of territory within regime range
Position along river Low High
Upstream Thailand* (China,
Burma)
Lao PDR
Downstream Viet Nam Cambodia
Note: * Thailand is considered to have a small fraction of territory within the Mekong River basin
compared to Lao PDR and Cambodia.
Source: Author’s own compilation.
Firstly, both non-member states belong to the upper left square. They are not
committed to the regime as they are not members, but have, nonetheless, show
some interest in the regime through their status as observers and the annual
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dialogue meetings. Their relation to the regime may be partially explained by
their position as extreme upstreamers and with only a limited fraction of their
territory within the basin. Secondly, Thailand, also located in the upper left
corner, is a member of the Mekong River regime and thus more committed to
basin cooperation. Notably, Thailand is situated downstream of both China and
Burma, and might therefore also be considered a mid-stream state. Within the
regime, Thailand has been accused of ‘dragging her feet’ and prolonging the
establishment of flow regime regulations. This is likely to be an effect of her
position as the furthest upstream state within the regime, as strict regulations
will provide more benefits to the states further downstream than to Thailand.
Thailand’s relation to the regime is a result of her location as a midstream country
overall, but upstream within the regime.
Thirdly, Cambodia is the only basin state with both a large fraction of territory
within the regime’s range and a downstream position. Given her geographical
position, one would expect Cambodia to be the most committed member of the
regime. Her engagement in the regime does, however, only to a limited extent
reflect this, despite her success in securing the natural reversal of the Tonle Sap
River in the 1995 Agreement and locating the FloodManagement and Mitigation
Programme in Phnom Penh. This is arguably due to the special political and
historical situation in Cambodia and the priorities of the present government.
Both Lao PDR and Viet Nam are in a middle position towards the regime, and
has behaved accordingly. They are engaged in the regime but have been reluctant
to accept all recommendations, as was explained above. It seems as if these two
geographical dimensions may explain some of the regime members’ commitment
to the regime.
5 Concluding Remarks
This article has provided an overview of the achievements and the effective-
ness of the Mekong River Commission, and highlighted how the geographical
characteristics of environmental regimes may influence their effectiveness. Such
geographical factors complement the existing explanatory framework for regime
effectiveness. It has been argued that although the Mekong River Commission
has collected an impressive amount of data on the Mekong River basin, the
regime or cooperation scheme has not been very effective at influencing the
policies of its member states. However, the low level of effectiveness is also due
to the membership of the Mekong River Commission, where the two upstream
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countries,most significantly China, are notmembers. This conclusion emphasises
the need for all relevant states to be included in a regime or cooperation scheme
for it to be as effective as possible. Furthermore, geographical position, such as
upstream/downstream and fraction of territory within the regime’s range, of the
members and potential members appears to influence the respective members’
dedication to the regime. This will in turn influence its effectiveness, where
upstream states and states with only a small fraction of their territory within the
regime’s boundaries will be less eager to cooperate than downstream states or
states with a major fraction of their territory located within the regime’s bound-
aries. One must, however, also bear in mind that domestic political situation
influences the contributions towards cooperation made by each member too.
Where does this leave further research on river basin regimes and environ-
mental regimes in general? Firstly, additional studies on the regimes of other
international river basins, preferably in developing countries, are needed. There
are several rivers in Southeast Asia, such as the Hong/Red River and Nu/Salween
River, which would make interesting cases. Analysing the policies related to these
rivers will be valuable to test the robustness of the suggestions made in this article,
and provide important lessons for further insight on river basin cooperation.
Secondly, the importance of including all relevant stakeholders in a cooperation
scheme has been highlighted. How may this be achieved? What may induce
powerful upstream states to cooperate with downstream neighbours? How does
lack of commitment from upstream states affect the cooperation taking place
within the regimes? And, importantly, how may the regimes be as effective as
possible even without the participation of all relevant stakeholders? These are
important questions for environmental regimes in general and for cooperation
on rivers and river basins in particular. As Southeast Asia is the home of several
international rivers, these questions are of significance for how the countries in
the region willmanage, and manage to cooperate about, their natural resources in
the years to come. The importance of international cooperation to ensure sound
management of common resources will probably only increase, but only those
who go with the flow of the rivers will know their course and their destination
in the future.
6 List of Interviewees – Institutions
Due to the sensitivity of the politics of the Mekong region, all interviewees were
promised anonymity. The list below indicates which institutions were visited
51 51
51 51
The Mekong River Commission 51
during the research phase of this article. All interviews were conducted during
January and February 2006 in China, Lao PDR and Thailand. The numbers in
the text do not in any way correspond to the list below.
6.1 NGOs and Academic Institutions
Asian International Rivers Centre, Yunnan University, China
Centre for Mountain Ecosystem Studies, ICRAF – Kunming Institute of Botany
CAS, China
Department ofWaterResource, Faculty of Engineering,Chulalongkorn University,
Thailand
Independent Researcher, Lao PDR
IUCN – The World Conservation Union, Asia Regional Office
IUCN – The World Conservation Union, Lao PDR Country Office
Management and Executive Recruitment Consultants Ltd, Thailand
Stockholm Environment Institute – Asia
Yunnan EcoNetwork, China
6.2 MRC Related Bodies and Governmental Bodies
Agriculture, Irrigation and Forestry Programme, Mekong River Commission
Center for Environmental Education& Communications of State Environmental
Protection Administration of China
College of Humanities and Development, Department of Development Studies
China Agricultural University
Lao National Mekong Committee
Programme Coordination Section, Mekong River Commission
Regional Environment Cooperation Division, International Cooperation Depart-
ment, State Environmental Protection Administration, P.R. China
Thailand National Mekong Committee
Thailand National Mekong Committee Secretariat
Water Utilisation Programme, Mekong River Commission
6.3 International Bodies/Organisations
International Section, Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate
Swedish Environmental Secretariat for Asia, SIDA, Embassy of Sweden, Thailand
Thailand Resident Mission, Asian Development Bank
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